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institutions but then abuse them to build non-democratic governance. The outcome
is a new form of authoritarian rule, which Levitsky and Way (2010) called
competitive authoritarianism and Zakaria (2003) termed illiberal democracy.
These strong and illiberal leaders have combined authoritarian governance in

substance and democratic institutions in form.

The competitive and strongman authoritarianism is not unfamiliar in modern
Korean history. Rhee Syngman and Park Chunghee before the 1972 martial
constitution were exemplary leaders of competitive authoritarianism because they

drove authoritarian rule while giving lip service to liberal democracy and
manipulating democratic institutions such as elections, multi-party competition, and
legislatures. Even under the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan governments of

1972 to 1988, legislative elections did not stop and these military leaders were
elected presidents via electoral college. Moreover, all three dictators were statist
leaders who attempted to represent the people of South Korea as a whole, stood
above government branches, and accumulated political power in the name of
achieving national goals such as an anti-communist agenda against North Korea and

economic development against poverty. Thus, the past dictatorship of South Korea
was closer to competitive and strongman authoritarianism than to closed military
rule in which a military junta rules a country without allowing elections, opposition

parties, and a legislature.

That a majority of the Korean citizens retain support for democracy but
consider strongman rule as a good governance model offers three specific
implications for the prospects of Korean democracy. One is that democratic

institutions are not likely to break down in the foreseeable future because seven in
ten citizens see democracy as a preferred system. Recent scholars of
democratisation have raised a question about the democratic utility of democratic
institutions (Zakaria 2003; Svolik 2019). According to them, elections and

legislatures may not serve democratic advancement, although they are likely to
improve enduring problems of authoritarian governance such as informational
asymmetry, lack of credibility, and violent succession. Thus, it is possible that
democratic institutions can continue without making democratic progress for the

long term and democracy in South Korea is not likely to be exceptional. การอภิปราย