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                   Combined, these results indicate that hybrids have gained 26% over the last
             decades, consequentially constituting the most prevalent group: 52% of South
             Korean citizens. This group was a minority (26%) in 1996 but outnumbered full
             democrats by a margin of 33% in 2018. Autocrats comprised only 8% in 1996,

             but they have increased to 18% in 2018. Thus, it is apparent that hybridisation of
             democratic and authoritarian orientations has become a dominant phenomenon in
             the minds of South Korean citizens.

                   If hybridisation and autocratisation of regime support are associated with

             democratic deconsolidation, what direction have Korean citizens driven in terms of
             democratic deconsolidation? As signalled in Figure 23.2 and confirmed in Figure
             23.3, while living with established democratic institutions, 52% of South Korean

             citizens have advanced support for strongman rule. Whereas 38% of South Koreans
             retain support for democracy, 14% have abandoned democratic support and have
             embraced strongman rule as the most preferred regime type. These findings
             suggest that cultural deconsolidation of South Korean democracy has already set in,
             and the coming regime welcomed by a majority of citizens is likely to be strongman

             rule with democratic institutions rather than military rule.

                   The final question remains to be answered: What social groups shoulder
             South Korean democracy and drive its hybridisation with strongman authoritarian

             rule? Recent scholars examining the trend of democratic support in the West have
             debated which social segments evince the erosion of democratic support. For
             example, Foa and Mounk (2016) found that democratic support has declined in the
             West, and young millennials and rich citizens are sceptical of democracy and most

             open to authoritarian alternatives. On the basis of the evidence, Foa and Mounk
             (2016) warned that scholars are overly confident that old consolidated democracies
             are unassailable and they fail to recognize signs of deconsolidation. Finally, Foa and
             Mounk (2017) declared the end of the consolidation paradigm.


                   On the other hand, not all scholars agree with them. In particular, Inglehart
             (2016) stated that declining support for democracy and increasing openness to
             nondemocratic alternatives are not found across democracies but are apparent only
             in the United States. This debate sparked subsequent online exchange in Journal of

             Democracy, with Norris (2017) and other scholars (Alexander and Welzel 2017;              การอภิปราย
             Voeten 2017) showing that the cultural foundation of democracy is solid and
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