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134 สรุปการประชุมวิชาการ
สถาบันพระปกเกล้า ครั้งที่ 23
ประชาธิปไตยในภูมิทัศน์ใหม่
The next implication is that against a backdrop of democratic institutions, the
authoritarian style of governance will tend to continue. This hybridisation of
democratic institutions and an authoritarian style of governance was evident during
the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye governments, and it has been observed
even in the Moon Jae-in government (Shin 2020). Because South Korean
presidents are strong in authority in comparison with other branches, they tend to
expand executive power to a maximum degree rather than practice the democratic
principle of constrained and limited government; their attempts to mount and wield
presidential power have resulted in constant struggles among political parties and
social groups without elevating democratic standards. As Przeworski (1991, 9) aptly
pointed out, democracy is consolidated and self-enforcing as the political stakes of
taking government power decline and government leaders practice limited power.
The principle of limited power is hard to practice due to strong presidentialism as
well as citizens’ demand for strongman leadership in South Korea.
Finally, the steady erosion of democratic support would be a significant barrier
to further democratic change because it no longer provides a sufficient amount of
democratic capital which can be used to deepen the democratic quality of South
Korea. Inevitably, Korean leaders would compromise between liberal norms of
democracy and populist demands of ordinary people, which works against the
systematic development of liberal democracy in South Korea.
Two questions arise from the analytical results about the cultural erosion of
South Korean democracy: How did the candlelight protest affect the prospect of
Korean democracy? Is democratic breakdown possible in Korea? With regard to the
first question, it is indisputable that the candlelight protest halted democratic
deconsolidation under the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye governments. What is
not clear is whether the candlelight protest can bring about further democratic
changes. Because the WVS 7 was conducted 8 months after the candlelight protest
officially ended in the vacancy election of May 2017, the results of the WVS 7 can
be used to determine the democratic effects of the candlelight protest on regime
support in South Korea. According to Figures 23.2 and 23.3, public support for
การอภิปราย democracy over authoritarianism had been declining before and this downward trend
continued after the candlelight protest. Therefore, the candlelight protest saved
South Korean democracy not because of mass demand for democracy but despite
its decline. Although slogans about democracy and popular sovereignty poured out