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                  effects on inclusive citizenship and checks and balances, not on democracy in
                  general, while it had negative effects on dictatorship. The results evidently show
                  that in countries with high income inequality the wealthy proved to be more (not
                  less) supportive of democracy as well as more (not less) opposed to dictatorship
                  than the poor. The finding seems less consistent with the individual-level
                  implications of the redistribution-democracy theory or the self-enforcing theory of
                  democracy. That the wealthy were more supportive of checks and balances, a core
                  principle of liberal democracy, appears to be more consistent with the expectation
                  of the elite-competition theory.


                  Table 2 Effects of Income Position on Regime Support: Unequal Countries

                   Tab le Effects of Income P osition on R egime Sup p ort:  U nequal Countries
                                        D emocracy      I n clusiv e   C heck s an d   D ictatorship
                                                       citiz en ship    b alan ces
                   I n come q uin tile
                    Secon d                .054*         -.047 *          -.003           -.03 2
                    T hird                 .046          -.018            -.015           -.067 *
                    F ourth                .045          -.013            .027            -.093 * *
                    F ifth                 .07 8 *       -.055           .106* *         -.13 5* * *
                   F emale                 -.020         .042* *          -.026           .061* *
                   A g e (y ears)         .004* * *       .001           .003 * * *      -.003 * * *
                   E ducation  (y ears)    .000          .009* * *       .019* * *       -.018 * * *

                   R -sq uare              .008           .005            .012             .017
                   (N)                    (597 8 )       (63 7 3 )       (593 9)          (6155)
                   E n tries are un stan dardiz ed reg ression  coefficien ts.
                  Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
                   * * *  P < .001 * *  P < .01 *  P < .05
                  *** P<.001 ** P<.01 * P<.05
                   Source: 2014-16 A B S I V

                  Source: 2014-16 ABS IV


                  Table 3 Effects of Income Position on Regime Support: Equal Countries

                   Tab le3Effects of Income P osition on R egime Sup p ort:  Equal Countries
                                       D emocracy      I n clusiv e   C heck s an d   D ictatorship
                                                      citiz en ship    b alan ces
                   I n come q uin tile
                     Secon d              -.020          .008           -.03 0           -.040
                     T hird               .002          -.048           -.013            -.004
                     F ourth              .041          -.049           .047             -.021
                     F ifth               .102*          .016           .064             -.03 9
                   F emale                .021          .053 * * *      -.042            -.03 1
                   A g e (y ears)        .007 * * *      .001          .005* * *        -.002* *
                   E ducation  (y ears)   .03 8 * * *    .018 * * *    .03 6* * *       -.025* * *        เอกสารประกอบการอภิปรายร่วมระหว่างผู้แทนจากต่างประเทศ

                   R -sq uare             .050           .018           .028             .026
                   (N)                   (3 27 0)       (3 3 7 7 )      (3 17 9)         (3 3 19)
                   E n tries are un stan dardiz ed reg ression  coefficien ts.
                   * * *  P < .001 * *  P < .01 *  P < .05
                  Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
                   Source: 2014-16 A B S I V

                  *** P<.001 ** P<.01 * P<.05

                  Source: 2014-16 ABS IV











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