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8     การประชุมวิชาการ
                สถาบันพระปกเกล้า ครั้งที่ 23
              ประชาธิปไตยในภูมิทัศน์ใหม่

                     The next implication is that against a backdrop of democratic institutions, the

               authoritarian style of governance will tend to continue. This hybridisation of
               democratic institutions and an authoritarian style of governance was evident during
               the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye governments, and it has been observed
               even in the Moon Jae-in government (Shin 2020). Because South Korean

               presidents are strong in authority in comparison with other branches, they tend to
               expand executive power to a maximum degree rather than practice the democratic
               principle of constrained and limited government; their attempts to mount and wield
               presidential power have resulted in constant struggles among political parties and

               social groups without elevating democratic standards. As Przeworski (1991, 9) aptly
               pointed out, democracy is consolidated and self-enforcing as the political stakes of
               taking government power decline and government leaders practice limited power.
               The principle of limited power is hard to practice due to strong presidentialism as

               well as citizens’ demand for strongman leadership in South Korea.

                     Finally, the steady erosion of democratic support would be a significant barrier
               to further democratic change because it no longer provides a sufficient amount of
               democratic capital which can be used to deepen the democratic quality of South

               Korea. Inevitably, Korean leaders would compromise between liberal norms of
               democracy and populist demands of ordinary people, which works against the
               systematic development of liberal democracy in South Korea.


                     Two questions arise from the analytical results about the cultural erosion of
               South Korean democracy: How did the candlelight protest affect the prospect of
               Korean democracy? Is democratic breakdown possible in Korea? With regard to the
               first question, it is indisputable that the candlelight protest halted democratic
               deconsolidation under the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye governments. What is

               not clear is whether the candlelight protest can bring about further democratic
               changes. Because the WVS 7 was conducted 8 months after the candlelight protest
               officially ended in the vacancy election of May 2017, the results of the WVS 7 can

               be used to determine the democratic effects of the candlelight protest on regime
               support in South Korea. According to Figures 23.2 and 23.3, public support for
        การอภิปราย   democracy over authoritarianism had been declining before and this downward trend
               continued after the candlelight protest. Therefore, the candlelight protest saved
               South Korean democracy not because of mass demand for democracy but despite

               its decline. Although slogans about democracy and popular sovereignty poured out
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