Page 83 - เอกสารประกอบการประชุมวิชาการ ครั้งที่ 23

82 การประชุมวิชาการ
สถาบันพระปกเกล้า ครั้งที่ 23
ประชาธิปไตยในภูมิทัศน์ใหม่

upper-class and high-income groups, college-educated citizens with political interest,

and ideologically progressive young generations. Democratic fervor has gradually
disappeared and openness to authoritarianism has risen among the same groups.
The proportions that are no longer full democrats are 48%, 47%, 50%, 42%,
44%, and 40% among the categories of the upper class, high income, college

education, high political interest, progressive ideology, and young generation,
respectively. The percentage increase in the hybrids ranges from 28% in the young
generation to 34% in the college-educated and high-income groups. Finally, the full
democrats are not distinguished across different social and political groups and they

are overwhelmed by the hybrids in 2018.

These analytical results have theoretical and practical implications.
Theoretically, as consistent with the expectations of the elite competition, neo-
modernisation, and political competition models, these actors mounted democratic

energy by supporting democracy and rejecting authoritarian alternatives in 1996. It
appeared that political coalitions for democratisation were formed among those
middle- and upper-class citizens with educational attainment and political interest on
the one hand and those progressive young generations on the other in the 1990s.

However, those variables of the actor-centric theories do not make differences
between the full democrats and the hybrids in 2018, which raises a question about
the validity of the recent actor-centric theories in explaining cultural politics of
democratic deconsolidation in South Korea.

What do these results make a practical implication about the state and
prospects of South Korean democracy? The results suggest that authoritarian forces
in Korea are in an offensive position, whereas democrats are in a defensive one.
Although democratic institutions are present, hybridisation of democracy and

authoritarianism is inevitable as an increasing number of citizens have already
withdrawn authentic support for democracy and consider strongman rule as a good
governance model.

The strongman rule with democratic institutions is a real alternative model to

liberal democracy around the world. Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Recep Erdogan in
การอภิปราย Turkey, and Viktor Orbán in Hungary rose to power through democratic elections

and, then, gradually subverted democracy. This type of democratic backsliding by

executive takeovers tends to proceed as illiberal leaders sustain democratic